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11.0 Summary
This document addresses the concern raised in the Savannah River Site (SRS) 
Acceptance Criteria (Reference 1, Section 6.a.3) about receiving an item that is over 
batched by 1.0 kg of fissile materials.  This document shows that the occurrence of 
this is incredible.
Some of the Department of Energy Standard 3013 (DOE-STD-3013) requirements 
are described in Section 2.1.  The SRS requirement is discussed in Section 2.2.  
Section 2.3 describes the way fissile materials are handled in the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Plutonium Facility (B332).  Based on the 
material handling discussed in Section 2.3, there are only three errors that could 
result in a shipping container being over batched.  These are: incorrect measurement 
of the item, selecting the wrong item to package, and packaging two items into a 
single shipping container.  The analysis in Section 3 shows that the first two events 
are incredible because of the controls that exist at LLNL.  The third event is 
physically impossible.  Therefore, it is incredible for an item to be shipped to SRS 
that is more than 1.0 kg of fissile materials over batched.
2.0 Background
2.1 3013 Requirements
The DOE-STD-3013 (Reference 2) limits the mass of materials in the 
containers.  The limits are 4.4 kg of Pu or U and 5.0 kg of bulk weight.  
Therefore, a 1.0 kg over batch of fissile material would result in 5.4 kg of 
fissile material and 6.1 kg bulk weight for pure plutonium oxide.
2.2 SRS Requirement
Section 6.a.3 of the SRS Acceptance Criteria (Reference 1) states the 
following:
Sufficient controls are established at the loading facility to ensure that the 
maximum credible (i.e. frequency >1E-6) over batch (process upset 
condition) for the loaded 9975 shipping container is 1.0 kg of fissile 
materials.  This determination shall be documented in a shipper site safety 
evaluation, a copy of which shall be provided to SRS for review and 
concurrence.
This requirement is based on the authorized basis of using the K Reactor 
building as a storage area for unopened 9975 shipping containers with welded 
shut 3013 cans in them.
2.2 LLNL Material Handling
The 3013 cans are loaded and welded in the Plutonium Packaging System 
(PuPS) that is located in the Plutonium Facility at LLNL.  The movements of 
2fissile materials are closely controlled in the facility because of criticality, 
Material Control and Accountability (MC&A), and security concerns.  
2.2.1 Controls:
Many of the controls associated with LLNL material handling are in 
place for criticality and MC&A control. One of the important control 
parameters for criticality control is the mass of fissile materials.  
Therefore, these controls also control the mass of fissile materials in a 
3013 can.  The controls that are used include:
MC&A Plan
The MC&A Plan (Reference 3) is consistent with the requirements of 
DOE Manual 470.4-6 (Reference 9), and has been prepared in 
accordance with implementing MC&A Plan Format and Content 
Guide.  DOE Order Manual 470.4-6 requires that the reportable level 
for plutonium and fissile uranium is grams.  The accidental or 
purposeful diversion of 1.0 kg of Pu or U235 would be quickly detected 
within the implementation of the MC&A Plan
Move Procedure
The Move Procedure (Reference 6) requires two Fissile Material 
Handlers (FMHs) to verify what is in the shipping workstation, the 
receiving station, and the specific item to be moved before transferring 
materials between workstations.  When the move is completed, two 
FMHs verify that the proper item had been moved before the transfer 
is complete.  Appendix A contains the operator aide for the Move 
Procedure.
COMATS
The FMHs use the COntrolled Materials Accountability and Tracking 
System (COMATS) to assist with maintaining MC&A.  The use of 
COMATS requires two knowledgeable people to verify what material 
is being moved and two knowledge people to acknowledge the receipt 
of material. The COMATS also keeps track of the fissile content of 
each item.  Therefore, the quantity of fissile materials in each package 
is constantly available.  The COMATS also checks moves against the 
criticality limits for the workstations before allowing a move.  
Appendix B contains a description of the COMATS.
Criticality limits
The criticality limits restrict the amount of fissile materials that can be 
used in a workstation (Reference 4, Section 5.1.2).  The criticality 
limits for the workstations associated with the Plutonium Packaging 
System (PuPS) are limited to 4.5 kg of Pu and 235U (Reference 5).  
This is slightly over the DOE-STD-3013 container limit of 4.4 kg Pu 
3and U235.  The workstations (WSs) associated with the PuPS are 
located in Room 1010 and are:
WS1019: floor of the PuPS Glovebox (LLNL Glovebox 5),
WS1020: storage well in the PuPS Glovebox,
WS1021: Inner Can Welding Hood, and
WS1022: Outer Can Welding Hood.
Any item containing 5.4 kg of Pu and 235U would violate the criticality 
limits on these workstations.  The workstations are prevented from 
exceeding criticality limits by having the FMH check the receiving 
workstation criticality conditions before a move is performed (move 
procedure) and the COMATS also checks that the criticality limits are 
not exceeded.  If the COMATS determines that the criticality limits are 
exceeded, it warns the operator.  Therefore, a container with a known 
quantity of greater than 4.5 kg of Pu would not be moved into the 
PuPS Glovebox.  
Requiring material measurements when moving material between 
MBAs
When a fissile material-containing package moves between the 
Material Balance Areas (MBAs) where the fissile material is packaged 
in the PuPS (located in MBA 850) and the vault storage or shipping 
preparation areas (MBA 100) the package content is measured.  
Therefore, before an item can be moved into MBA 100 from MBA 
850, the fissile content requires measurement.
Shipping container load procedures.
This ensures that shipping containers are loaded properly.
Calibration check of scales each day they are used.
Each day that a scale is used, the calibration of the scales is checked 
using 4 different calibrated weights by the FMHs.  The scales must 
measure within their control limits to be used.
2.2.2 Material Handling Example for Oxide
A single example will be used here to show the reader how material is 
handled in the Plutonium Facility at LLNL.  However, there are a 
number of other options available for processing such as material 
moved from the metal or oxide preparation box rather than the vault.  
For this example we will assume that there are three cans each 
containing 2 kg of plutonium as an oxide, located in the vault.  This 
material will be transferred to a workstation in MBA 850 where the 
oxides will be packaged into convenience cans before transfer into the 
PuPS Glovebox.  The convenience can will be limited to 4.4 kg of 
4plutonium and 5.0 kg of bulk weight per the 3013 Standard (Reference 
2).  
Before the material will be released from the vault, the fissile content 
will have been determined by non-destructive analysis (NDA) such as 
calorimetry and gamma isotopics.  During this time, the material is 
placed on measurement hold by the Measurement Verification and 
Control Group.  This is done in the COMATS as an administrative 
control to prevent further processing of the material before 
measurements are complete and analyzed.  The measurements are 
made by Material Management Operations personnel and are 
submitted to the Measurement Verification and Control Group.  The 
Measurement Verification and Control Group analyses that data to 
determine if the information meets the quality control requirements.  
This review includes the comparison of readings made from standards, 
repeatability of measurements, and a comparison of the readings to the 
amount reported to be in the container.  If the measurements pass all of 
the reviews, the Measurement Verification and Control Group 
removes the measurement hold.
When the fissile content is established, it is available for processing.  
A request is made to Materials Management Operations (MM) for the 
items.  A COMATS transfer is initiated using the Move Procedure.  
The shipper (MM) and receiver (FMH in Room 1010) identify the 
material to be moved and the destination and intermediate 
workstations. Then the contents of the receiving, sending, and 
intermediate workstations are verified using two people.  The 
COMATS system is then consulted to verify that it is safe to transfer 
the material through the workstations.  Once this has been checked, the 
shipper initiates the transfer in COMATS.  The cans are removed from 
the vault storage area and transported to Room 1010 by two FMHs.  
Then the cans are transferred into WS1016.  The move is completed 
by having two FMH verify that the appropriate item had been moved. 
In WS1016, the three cans of oxide are opened and they are combined 
into a convenience can to obtain a maximum mass of 4.4 kg Pu and a 
maximum of 5.0 kg net weight.  The remaining 1.6 kg Pu is placed 
into a separate container.  Each of these items will be given a new 
unique serial number (SN#) and be re-characterized by recording 
information about the item such as net weight, packaging 
configuration and fissile weight into COMATS.  This information is 
entered by one FMH and verified by another FMH.  Then the 4.4 kg 
Pu container is closed in WS 1016.
The canned oxide is transferred to WS1019 (floor of the PuPS 
glovebox) through the tunnel by using the Move Procedure and 
5COMATS.  Again this requires two FMHs to verify that the proper can 
has been moved.
In WS1019, the can is re-weighed to verify that there has not been a 
significant weight gain.  The weighing also checks that the plutonium 
contents are within the 3013 requirements of a bulk weight of 5.0 kg 
and fissile material weight of 4.4 kg.  The criticality limit for this WS 
is 4.5 kg Pu and 235U.
Next the convenience can is transferred to WS1021 (Inner Can 
Welding Hood) using COMATS and the Move Procedure.  A second 
FMH has to verify that the appropriate can had been moved.  The 
criticality limit for this WS is 4.5 kg Pu and 235U.  Then the Inner Can 
is welded and cut.  The welded Inner Can is than checked for 
contamination and leak checked.  The welded Inner Can is re-
characterized with a new unique SN# for COMATS.  The COMATS 
SN# will contain the Inner Can SN#.
The welded Inner Can is then transferred to the WS 1022 (Outer Can 
Welding Hood) using COMATS and the Move Procedure.  Again, the 
transfer is verified by a second FMH.  The criticality limit for this WS 
is 4.5 kg Pu and 235U.  Then the Outer Can is welded.  The item again 
will be re-characterized and given a new unique SN# for COMATS.  
The COMATS SN# will contain the Outer Can SN#.  It is transferred 
back to WS 1021 using the COMATS and the Move Procedure for 
leak checking.
The Outer Can is then transferred to MM for NDA and storage.  This 
involves review by two FMHs from Room 1010 and two MM 
personnel to complete the transfer.  The MM personnel check that the 
appropriate item has been transferred before they complete the move.  
When the MM receives the item, they weigh the item and then inform 
the Measurement Verification and Control Group, who place a 
measurement hold on it.
The can may go to the vault for storage while awaiting queuing into 
the measurement station.  The MM personnel measure the container 
using NDA such as calorimitry and gamma isotopics.  The 
measurements are made by Material Management Operations 
personnel and are submitted to the Measurement Verification and 
Control Group.  The Measurement Verification and Control Group 
analyzes that data to determine if the information meets the quality 
control requirements.  This review includes the comparison of readings 
made from standards, repeatability of measurements, and a comparison 
of the readings to the amount reported to be in the container.  If the 
6measurements pass all of the reviews the Measurement Verification 
and Control Group removes the measurement hold.
After the measurement hold has been removed, the 3013 Outer Can 
will be stored or transferred for packaging for shipping.  This transfer 
involves COMATS, the Move Procedure and two MM personnel 
verifying that it had moved to the new MBA.  The 3013 Outer Can 
will be load into the 9975 shipping containers.  The 3013 Outer Can is 
placed into the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) of the 9975.  The 
lid is screwed on and leak checked.  Then the PCV is lowered into the 
Secondary Containment Vessel (SCV) and the lid of the SCV is 
screwed on and leak checked.  Then the SCV is lowered into the 9975 
overpack and the overpack is closed.
2.2.3 Material Handling Example for Metal
The packaging of metal is similar to that of packaging of the oxide 
except that metal is packaged with a maximum of 2.5 kg Pu and 235U 
into 4” x 4” cans.  Two 4” x 4” cans can with a maximum fissile 
content of 4.4 kg be loaded into the 3013 Inner Can.
3 Analysis
Based on the above example the following errors could occur that might result in 
the final 9975s being over batched:
· Incorrect measurement of an item: An error is made in the measurement such 
that the reported value is 4.4 kg instead of 5.4 kg of fissile materials, which is 
the actual value.
· Selecting the wrong item for packaging, and
· Placing more than one 3013 can in a 9975 shipping container.
Each of these errors are analyzed below.
3.1 incorrect measurement of the item
3.1.1 Postulated Error
The postulated error for this situation is that the measurement was 
made incorrectly such that the measured value is much lower (1 kg of 
SNM) than the actual value.  The rigorous review of the measurements 
and the accuracy of the measuring devices as required by DOE Manual 
470.4-6 prevent this.
3.1.2 Measurement System
Reference 3 discusses the measurement controls in Section 7.3.8 and is 
summarized here:
7All measurable SNM items entering storage locations in Building 332 
are placed on measurement hold so that they can receive accountability 
measurements.  The Measurement Verification and Control Group 
Personnel review daily reports of items entering the storage locations 
and determine which items are measurable.  
The Measurement Verification and Control Group completes an 
Inventory Measurement/Characterization Form (MRF) for all items 
requiring measurement.  Completed forms are forwarded to the 
Operations Group personnel who perform the measurements.
After a required measurement has been completed, the MRF and all 
measurement printouts are forwarded to the Measurement Verification 
and Control Group.  The Measurements Verification and Control 
Group personnel check the measurement control charts for the relevant 
instruments to determine if appropriate standards were assayed before 
and after the accountability measurement and if the measurement 
system was within the control limits of the equipment.  The 
Measurement Verification and Control Group personnel also review 
the measurement output to determine if the results seem valid.  This 
review included comparing results to book values and any previous 
measurement results, if available.  For accountability/ verification 
measurements, the differences between book values and measurement 
results are compared to the verification measurement 
acceptance/rejection criteria.
If significant differences exist between the latest measurement results 
and book values or previous measurements, additional measurements 
are required on a new MRF and an examination of potential reasons 
for disagreement is started.  If further measurements support a 
difference and examination of all records does not indicate any 
potential diversion, the accountability database is updated.  The 
booked SNM element weight can never exceed the net weight of the 
item.
After all measurement issues have been resolved the Measurement 
Verification and Control Group personnel sign the MRF and the item 
is taken off of measurement hold.
The independent measurements and review of the measurements and 
methodology ensure that an accurate reading is made from the 
machine.
3.1.3 Equipment Uncertainty
The mass of fissile materials is determined by using various NDA 
equipment including: neutron multiplicity counter, segmented gamma 
8scanner, calorimitry, and gamma isotopics.  The accuracy of these 
instruments are:
Instrument Accuracy Section of 
Reference 3
Neutron Multiplicity Counter Standard Deviation 
of 0.0202
Page F-2
Segmented Gamma Scanner 3.1% Uncertainty Page G-3
Calorimetry Standard Deviation 
0.28%
Page H-5
Gamma Isotopics 0.116% Uncertainty Page I-2
The preferred NDA methods are calorimetry and gamma isotopics.  
The gamma isotopics are used to determine the ratio of the isotopics 
and the calorimeter to determine the amount of the nuclides.  The 3013 
can is packaged with 4.4 kg of fissile material.  Assuming that it is 
weapons grade (WG) plutonium, it would generate about 12 W (see 
Table 1). Calorimeter 29 would be used to measure the heat generation 
of this can.  It is capable of measuring 3.7 to 20 watts (Reference 3, 
pg. H-1).  If the can had a 1.0 kg over batch, it would contain 5.4 kg of 
WG Pu, which would generate 15 W (Table 1).  The standard 
deviation for the total uncertainty for this calorimeter is 0.28% (Ref 3, 
page H-5)
Table 1: Power Generation for 
15 Year-Old Weapons Grade
from Reference 7, pg. 3-86
Isotope wt% Watts/gram Element Watt/gram Total
Pu238 0.036 0.567 0.00020412
Pu239 93.3 1.93E-03 0.00180069
Pu240 5.99 7.09E-03 0.00042469
Pu241 0.282 3.41E-03 9.6162E-06
Pu242 0.04 1.16E-04 4.64E-08
Am241 0.294 0.1145 0.00033663
Watts/g WG Pu 0.00277579
4.4 kg WG Pu 12.2 W
5.4 kg WG Pu 15.0 W
3.1.4 Probability of Error
The probability of the calorimeter reading being off by 1 kg is 
determined by looking at how many standard deviations it is off from 
the normal.  There is a 65% probability that the measured number is 
within 1 standard deviation of the actual number, 95% within 2 
standard deviations, and 99.7% within 3 standard deviations.  For the 
measurement to be off by 1.0 kg from the actual value requires an 
inaccuracy of (5.4-4.4)/4.4 = 22.7% or 22.7/.28% = 81 standard 
9deviations.  This means that it is incredible for the instrument to be off 
by 1.0 kg.
The combination of the accuracy of the measurement equipment with 
the rigorous review of the data by the Measurement Verification and 
Control Group insures that the measurement of the material will not be 
off by 1.0 kg of fissile materials.
3.2 Selecting the wrong item to ship.
3.2.1 Postulated error
This error would be caused by selecting an incorrect item to be 
shipped.  This could occur by the operator packing item A when he 
should have packaged item B or if the item was packaged before its 
measurements were complete and the fissile content had been verified.  
If the fissile content of the item incorrectly selected was 4.4 kg or less 
of Pu and U235 this would still not over batch the shipping container.  
The preparation of the 3013 cans is controlled such that the probability 
of over batching them is about 10-12 (See Section 3.2.4)
3.2.2 Description of System
There are a number of controls in place to ensure that the proper 
material is packaged and transferred.  These controls have been 
instituted for the purposes of criticality and MC&A control.  They also 
ensure that the 3013 cans are not over batched.  Many of these controls 
are administrative and therefore the probability of an error is 
determined by human error rates.  These controls include:
Implementation of the MC&A Plan
This ensures that material will not be packaged for shipping before 
being measured.
The criticality limits
The criticality limits on the PuPS workstations are set at 4.5 kg of Pu 
and 235U.  This is slightly over the 3013 allowable amount of fissile 
materials (4.4 kg) but less than 1 kg over the 3013 limit.  
Calibration check of scales each day they are used.
Each day that a scale is used for MC&A measurements, the calibration 
of the scales are checked using 4 different calibrated weights by the 
FMHs.  This insures that the weighing is accurate.
Move Procedure
The Move Procedure requires the shipper and receiver to both 
understand what is being sent.  Therefore, if the receiver gets a 
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different item than expected, he will stop the transfer and investigate 
the cause.
COMATS
The use of the COMATS system requires two individuals to verify any 
modifications of materials.  This provides a double check of all 
operations including material balances.
3.2.3 System Uncertainty
The human error probabilities associated with material movements 
were developed as part of the B332 Documented Safety Analysis 
(Reference 7, Appendix B).  The probabilities used were:
Event Failure Probability
Failure of administrative control (nominal 
value)
5 x 10–3
Checker (or second operator) verification 
error (nominal value)
1 x 10-1
3.2.4 Probability of Error
The Human Error Probabilities and the LLNL handling description 
(Section 2.3) were used to develop a fault tree to determine the 
probability of this error occurring.  The fault tree is shown in Figures 
1, 2 and 3.
For an over batch item to get to SRS requires that an over batch item 
be created and then the over batch item needs to be packaged.  First an 
over batch item needs to be created.  The fault tree for calculating the 
probability of this occurring is shown in Figure 1.  Material is moved 
into a glove box and assembled into convenience can(s).  At this point 
two operators verify that the amount of material in the convenience 
container(s).  This is represented by events 1, 2, 3 with the FMHs mis-
reading the scale at a probability of 5.0 x 10-4.  There could also be a 
computer error such as data entry that could also generate an over 
batched convenience can (events 4, 5 and 6).  These result in a failure 
probability of 5.0 x 10-4.  Either of these errors could result in an over 
batched convenience can.  Therefore, the probabilities are added to 
give 1.0 x 10-3 (event 7).  Then the convenience can is transferred to 
the 3013 welding glovebox where the material is weighed again.  To 
generate an over batched 3013 can requires that when the FMH checks 
the weight of the convenience cans(s) the same kind of scale mis-
reading failure occurs, with a failure probability of 5.0 x 10-4 (events 8, 
9, 10).  Then the part is sent to the vaults.  Prior to putting the 3013 
container into storage it is weighed again to verify the weight.  The 
probability of failure for this is the same as for the initial 3013 
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weighing (events 11, 12, and 13).  Therefore, the probability that an 
over batched 3013 container will get stored in the vault has an overall 
probability of failure of 2.5 x 10-10 (Event 14),
To place this over batched can into a shipping container requires that 
either the wrong container is selected and placed in the shipping 
package or the over batched container is believed to be under mass 
(was not measured) and it is placed into the shipping container.  The 
probability of selecting the wrong container is shown in Figure 2.  The 
item is retrieved from the vault by two FMHs and is transferred to the 
packaging area.  The probability that the FMHs will select the wrong 
container has a probability of 5.0 x 10-4 and is covered by events 15, 
16, and 17.  At the packaging area the items is checked against the 
paperwork to ensure the correct container is being packaged.  The 
probability of failure there is covered by events 18, 19, and 20.  Both 
the first check and the second check have to be satisfied before the 
container will be packaged.  Therefore, the probabilities are multiplied, 
resulting in a probability of receiving the wrong container as 2.5 x 10-7 
(Event 21).  
The probability of packaging an over batched can is shown in Figure 
3.  The left branch covers the case where a wrong container is selected 
and it is over batched.  This has the probability of 6.3 x 10-17 (Events 
21, 14, and 23).  The right branch is for the case where the container is 
over batched and it was not measured.  When a container is sent to 
MM, it is placed on a list to be measured.  If it did not get on the list 
then it would not be measured and would not be placed on 
measurement hold.  The probability of the item not getting placed on 
the measurement hold list is 5.0 x 10-3 (event 22).  Combining this 
with the probability that the container is over batched results in a 
failure probability of 1.3 x 10-12 (event 24).  Since the shipping 
package can be over batched by using a wrong can that is over batched 
or by an unmeasured can that is over batched, the probabilities are 
added.  This results in the overall probability of an over batched 
shipping packaging of 1.3 x 10-12 per operation (Event 25).
3.3 Double loading the shipping container.
3.3.1 Postulated Error
It has been shown that it is incredible to send a 3013 can with greater 
than 5.0 kg of fissile materials to be shipped.  It is conceivable that the 
shipping container could be over batched if two 3013 container were 
inserted into it.  The physical structure of an assembled 9975 shipping 
container and the use of the 9975 loading procedure precludes this 
from occurring.
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3.3.2 Description of System
The configuration of the 9975 is shown in Figures 4 and 5.  These 
figures and the following information are from Reference 8.  The 
Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) has an internal size of 15 inches 
deep and a minimum diameter of 5.02 inches.  The 3013 outer can has 
the dimensions of 10 inches tall and 4.963 inches in diameter.  
Therefore, only a single 3013 can physically fit within the PCV of the 
9975.
The Secondary Containment Vessel (SCV) has an internal depth of 
about 21.5 inches.  Therefore, two 3013 Outer Cans can be placed into 
a SCV.  The probability of this is incredible because the procedure 
specifies how the packaging goes together and it also requires leak 
checks on both the PCV and SCV before the drum can be closed. 
3.3.3 Probability of Error
The probability of error is incredible because the packaging of the 
9975 will be done by a procedure that requires a number of checks to 
verify that the equipment is assembled correctly including leak checks 
of the PCV and SCV.
4.0 Results
This paper showed that there are sufficient controls at LLNL to ensure that the maximum 
credible (i.e. frequency >1E-6) over batch (process upset condition) for the loaded 9975 
shipping container is 1.0 kg of fissile materials.  The controls assure that:
1) The probability of a measurement error is incredible because of the accuracy of the 
measurement equipment and the rigorous review given to it before the packaged 
material is released,
2) The probability that an unmeasured 3013 can containing greater than 5.4 kg of 
fissile materials was incredible, and
3) The probability of more than one 3013 can being loaded into a 9975 was incredible.
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Figure 1: Fault Tree for Sending Over Batched DOE-STD-3013 Container to Materials Management
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Figure 2: Fault Tree for Packaging the Wrong Container  Figure 3: Fault Tree for Packaging an Over Batch Container
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Appendix A – Operators Aid for Move Procedure
Fissile Material Move Procedure
S = Shipper’s responsibility; 
R = Receiver’s responsibility
Identify
1. The material to be moved. (S/R)
2. The destination and intermediate 
workstations. (S/R)
3. OSP and FSP Controls. (S/R)
4. The material characteristics. (S/R)
5. Communicate safety information. (S/R)
Verify
6. Inventory the workstation(s). (S/R)
7. Verify the ability to safely move 
the material. (S/R)
8. Communicate the readiness to ship
and receive. (S/R)
9. Initiate the move in COMATS. (S)
Move
10. Bag out the material. (S)
11. Move the material. (S/R)
12. Bag in the material. (R)
13. Complete the move in COMATS. (R)
Post
14. Post the new COMATS workstation 
inventories. (S/R)
Rev. 1  6/15/98
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Appendix B – COMATS description
LLNL utilizes a computer-based accounting system, the COntrolled Materials 
Accountability and Tracking System (COMATS), along with supporting 
documentation to meet DOE nuclear material accounting requirements.  COMATS 
has two independent components, a ledger database for each material type, and an 
inventory database that identifies each item of inventory by material type and 
location.  These components provide assurance that the accounting records are 
complete and accurate.
Every action that happens with a container of fissile materials is to be recorded in 
the COMATS.  The operations that are recorded, include:
Moves between workstations
Combinations – putting two or more items together
Splits – separating a single item into multiple items
Each operation that is entered in the COMATS requires a verifier to check that the 
operation had been completed and that the data input is correct.
